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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BRYCE E. ROE, RALPH L. JERMAN
and B. L. DART, JR., doing business
as ROE, JERMAN & DART, a partnership, and ROE, J E R M A N &
DART, a business partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10974

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory relief brought by
Plaintiffs asking the lower Court to find that Section 203-2 (a) Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, as
Amended, is unconstitutional, and, in addition, is in excess
of the authority of Appellant Salt Lake City as granted in
Section 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1962. For the Court's
review the complete Ordinance is set out as Appendix 1 in
this Brief.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Based upon the pleadings, answers to interrogatories
and memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant, respectively, the lower Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and held that the Ordinance in question
(Salt Lake City Ordinance, Section 20-3-2 (b) (a)) was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs and that Defendant
was without statutory authorization to enact the same under 10-8-80 U. C. A., 1962.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals from the order of summary judgment entered against it and asks that this Court reverse
the same and hold that Appellant is entitled to summary
judgment in its favor, sustaining the constitutional validity
of the questioned Ordinance, 20-3-2 (a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case was submitted to the trial Court on stipulated
facts as set out in the pleadings and published interrogatories. Appellant's Statement of Facts in its Brief, while essentially correct, falls short of a full presentation of the substantial facts particularly with respect to the unreasonable
and arbitrary discrimination evoked by the Ordinance as
disclosed by the City's answers to interrogatories.
Accepting, therefore, the Appellant's Statement as far
as it extends, the following facts should be and are added
as bearing upon the actual discrimination evoked by the
questioned Ordinance against the Plaintiffs. The City in
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its answers to interrogatories, admitted that the Ordinance
resulted in the following comparisons (assuming gross
business revenues to exceed $10,000.00 annually) :
A partnership of three lawyers with two secretary
employees would be taxed $96.00 ($30 per partner),
while a partnership of three stockbrokers with two
secretary employees would be taxed $42.00 ($30 for
the first partner and $3 each additional partner or employee). A chemical corporation with five employees
(three of whom are stockholders) would also be taxed
$42.00.
A law partnership consisting of ten partners, ten
associate lawyers and fifteen legal stenographers would
be taxed $875.00, while a mining corporation with thirty-five full time employees consisting of a manager,
thirteen mining engineers, one staff lawyer, two accountants, one surveyor, one appraiser and fifteen
stenographers would be taxed only $132.00. (See Defendant's answers to interrogatories R. 17-22.)
Appellant in its Brief acknowledges "that the license tax
imposed upon partners and associates engaged in the enumerated professions is greater than the license tax imposed
upon partners and associates in other non-professional business" (App. Br. p. 4). And the lower Court determined
that the Ordinance did in fact require Plaintiffs "to pay
a license fee tax on a formula and basis which exceeds and
is substantially dissimilar from the license fee tax paid by
non-professional individuals, partnerships, corporations and
associations" (R. 30-32).
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The trial Court further found and as a part of its Findings stated that "when compared to non-professional business individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations, the license tax under the Ordinance is dissimilar and
excessive as to Plaintiffs, solely by virtue of the fact that
the individual Plaintiffs are practicing lawyers and Plaintiff-partnership is a law partnership" (Findings of Fact R.
31). It concluded that there was "no reasonable basis for
discriminating between Plaintiffs and non-professional business individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations" under the Ordinance (R. 32), and that it, therefore,
was unconstitutional and void, since it denied to Plaintiffs
due process of law and the full and equal protection of the
law (R. 32-33). In so doing, the trial Court decreed that
Appellant was without the limits of statutory authority under §10-8-80 U. C. A., 1962, to enact the Ordinance.

One additional comment is required respecting the
facts before the Court. Appellant has attached, as an Appendix to its Appeal Brief, a pamphlet entitled "Economic
Facts About Law Practice", which purportedly was published by a committee of the American Bar Association in
1966. Considerable reliance is placed on this pamphlet by
the City not as an authoritative treatise or precedent which
bears upon the legal issues before the Court, but as proof
of the truth of independent, evidentiary facts regarding the
income of latvyers doing business in a partnership or as sole
practitioners in Utah. (S'ee App. Br. pp. 22-23.)
An inspection of the record in this case will reveal that
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this pamphlet was not introduced in evidence in the trial
Court and it is not before this Court on appeal. Indeed, the
appendix was not even offered in the lower Court, Plaintiffs have had no opportunity to object to its admissibility
on the grounds of relevancy, lack of foundation, and hearsay, and the trial Court has had no opportunity to consider
any such proffer of evidence or to be apprised of its nature.
This Court has spoken sufficiently on the matter, as to
make the citation of precedent needless, that factual matters may not be introduced for the first time on appeal and
that this Court will not consider any proffer of new facts
in the determination of the appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
move and petition the Court to strike the Appendix to Appellant's Brief, or to disregard the same in its consideration
of the issues of law presented.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ORDINANCE 20-3-2 EVOKES AN UNCONSTIT U T I O N A L DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS.
Factually, there is no dispute whatsoever that attorneys are subjected to a substantially heavier tax burden than
are all other non-professional businesses. It is Plaintiffs'
contention that this discriminatory treatment cannot be
justified and thus renders the tax, as applied to them, unconstitutionally void.
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The guiding principle in analyzing such discrimination
was stated in Orem City v. Pyne, 16 U. 2d 355, 401 P. 2d
181 (1965) wherein this Court adopted an opinion of District Judge Maurice Harding:
"[C]ity licensing ordinances enacted for tax
purposes must be strictly construed, and in cases of
reasonable doubt, the construction should be against
the government. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine
Co., 284 U. S. 498, 52 S. Ct. 260, 263, 76 L. Ed. 422.
Appeals of School District of City of Allentown
(1952) 370 Pa. 161, 87 A. 2d 480." Judge Harding's
opinion, page 2.
The full text of Judge Harding's opinion in the Orem City
case is set out herein as Appendix 2.
Plaintiffs do not contend herein that the City does not
have the power to levy any tax at all against members of the
legal profession. This question was w^ll settled by 10-8-80
U. C. A. (Repl. Vol. 1962) as applied to lawyers by the
Court in Davis V. City of Ogden, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d
616 (1959). Under Davis, lawyers are subject to a municipal license fee tax, as are other members of the business
community. But neither Davis nor §10-8-80, gives the City
the discretion or authority to enact a discriminatory and
abusive tax against attorneys. In point of fact, §10-8-80 expressly proscribes the same by conditioning the City's power
as follows:
"All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform
in respect to the class upon which they are imposed."
And as noted in Mathews V. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac.
303 (1900), a similar prohibition against discrimination is
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to be found in the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution. (Amendment XIV.)
The basic question, therefore, is whether there is a
reasonable basis for taxing the business of a lawyer differently than non-professional business organizations. This
Court has previously spelled out the test to be applied:
"Our function is to determine whether an enactment operates equally on all persons similarly situated. If it does, then the discrimination is within
permissible legislative limits. If it does not, then
the differentiation would be without reasonable
basis and the act does not meet the test of constitutionality." Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476,
489, 206 P. 2d 153, 160 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
This question is answered without ambiguity by this
Court in its opinion in Davis v. Ogden City, supra. The
Ordinance in that case, enacted by Ogden City, provided
that each person who engaged in business had to obtain a
business license. The fee for the license was graduated according to the gross receipts of the business. In the definition of "business", the Ordinance provided that it should
include "persons engaged in any profession, trade, craft,
business, occupation, or other calling." Consequently, the
Ogden Ordinance applied equally and on the same basis to
all businesses, be they professional, non-professional or
whatever. (The Salt Lake City Ordinance, as noted above,
does not have this virtue of uniformity.) The first question
before the Court in Davis was whether the City had the
power to exact such a tax from members of the legal profession. In its opinion, this Court analyzed the statutory
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basis for such a tax and concluded that Ogden City had the
power to tax businesses, including the professions.
However, in reaching this decision, the Court made a
number of observations which are of paramount importance
to the proper determination of the instant case. In holding
that the Ogden tax was not discriminatory, this Court
stressed the fact that the Ordinance applied equally to "all
businesses" within the corporate limits of the city and without any economic discrimination as between lawyers and
other businesses.
In fact, the Davis decision goes to great lengths to
point out that lawyers, so far as being liable for the tax,
held no protective sanctuary or immunity from the Ordinance. Lawyers were to be treated as other businesses, there
being no justification for classifying lawyers differently
than others in the Community. In this regard, the Court
stated :
"As members of the Bar, their admission to
practice and their professional conduct after admission are essentially matters to be regulated by the
judicial department of the state. As members and
citizens of the state, county, and city, their rights,
privileges and immunities, as well as their duty to
pay a fair share of the expenses of government, like
those of any other citizen, are controlled by the laws,
ordinances and regulations of the political body of
which they are a part and from which they receive
protection. No one could reasonably contend that
lawyers as a class are not subject to laws enacted
pursuant to the police powers of the state or municipality and the members of the profession would protest any attempt to deny to them the services af-
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forded by the various sovreignties. There is no
rational basis for a contention that lawyers are
privileged because of their calling and should not be
subject to the provisions of an ordinance enacted for
the purpose of raising revenue to defray city expenses unless there is a showing that the ordinance
is discriminatory"
215 P. 2d at 622-23 (Emphasis
added.)
The rationale carved out by the Court in Davis is of major
consequence here. For the Ogden license tax was sustained
in the Davis decision for the single reason that the Ordinance treated attorneys in the same fashion and equally
with other businesses. The Court continued in Davis V.
Ogden City:
"The municipality, in imposing an occupational
tax upon attorneys, is not interfering with state regulations, for it is not attempting to prescribe qualifications for attorneys different from or additional
to those prescribed by the state. It is merely providing for an increase in its revenue by imposing a tax
upon those who, by pursuing their profession within
its limits, are deriving benefits from the advantages
especially afforded by the city. The tax is levied upon the business of practicing law, rather than upon
a person because he is an attorney at law" 215 P.
2d at 623. (Emphasis added.)
This Court, therefore, has already determined the point
here in question. In Davis, it was held that there is no
rational basis for a reasonable classification as between
lawyers and other businesses. In Davis, the effect was that
lawyers should be taxed the same as other businesses and
that is all that Plaintiffs ask here — to be treated the
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same, no better and no worse, than all other businesses. The
classification with which we are here concerned is composed
of "businesses". The Court in Davis emphasized this as follows:
"Being an occupation tax, the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary because it includes all
businesses operated within the city. There is no denial of equal protection, no invasion of the privileges
and immunities of any class of citizens and the ordinance operates equally upon all persons similarly
situated." 215 P. 2d at 623. (Emphasis added.)
Equality is the very element missing in Ordinance 20-3-2 (a)
under attack herein. It specifically and intentionally discriminates against lawyers and other professional business
organizations.
The principles thus enunciated in Davis have been more
recently reaffirmed in Orem City V. Pyne, supra. This case
also dealt with an occupation tax enacted under the color
of §10-8-80 U. C. A. (Repl. Vol. 1962). Judge Harding analyzed the problem as follows:
"[T]he classification by the legislative body
must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with
uniformity upon similar kinds of businesses and
with substantial equality of the tax burden to all
members of the same class. The imposition of taxes
which are to a substantial degree unequal in their
operation upon similar kinds of businesses is prohibited." Page 3 of Judge Harding's opinion. (Emphasis added.)
Based upon this reasoning Judge Harding and subsequently
this Court held that the Orem City tax was unconsititutional
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as applied because it accorded a different treatment to various businesses engaged in the sale of tangible personal
property. As put in the Harding opinion and ratified by
this Court:
"Why should one business selling tangible personal property at retail be subjected to a tax of up
to $300.00 per year, while other businesses (also
selling tangible personal property at retail) such
as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement
plant, creamery, butcher shop, photography shop,
or a dealer specializing in the sale of goods made in
Japan, Hong Kong, Formosa, China, or India, doing
the same volume of business, be taxed $25.00 ?" Page
3 of Judge Harding's opinion.
The same reasoning applies with equal finesse to the Ordinance now before the Court. To paraphrase the rationale
of the Or em- City decision:
"Why should a firm of three lawyers with two
secretaries be taxed $96.00 per year while other businesses also rendering personal and individual services, such as a stock brokerage, a firm of chemists,
a public relations firm, an advertising firm, a beauty
shop, a firm of automotive technicians, an assay office, a private detective agency doing business in
the same volume, the same income, and with the
same structure be taxed only $42.00 ?"
The answer to this rhetorical question must be the same as
that found by this Court in Orem City v. Pyne — the tax is
"unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory." Interestingly, Appellant fails to refer to, cite, or discuss the holding
in the Orem City opinion, although the case was the subject

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
of much attention in the arguments before the trial Court
herein.
In light of the patent discrimination of the subject Ordinance, the following statement in Mathews V. Jensen, 21
Utah 207, 227, 61 Pac. 303, 308 (1900) is apropos:
•'Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily invaded or annihilated, under the mere guise of a license. One class of citizens can not thus be compelled to bear the burdens of government, to the advantage of all other classes. The law, as we have
seen, will not permit it. Neither the Constitution nor
the statute authorizes boards of county commissioners to enact ordinances, as in this instance, to tax
citizens arbitrarily and unjustly, by license which
confers no privilege that was not previously enjoyed,
and which has no view to regulation."
It requires no extension of this philosophy to hold that one
professional business, i.e., lawyers, cannot be taxed more
oppressively than another business of a non-professional
nature. In this instance the professional business organizations, being taxed at a greater rate, are bearing an unjust
portion of the burdens of government, to the general benefit of non-professional organizations. As noted in Mathews
V. Jensen, supra, such discrimination constitutes a denial
of equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions as well as the deprivation of property without due
process of law.
The City concedes at page 15 of its Brief, that a license
tax must "operate on all alike under the same circum-
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stances", but argues that the Ordinance under attack herein
does not discriminate and "applies equally to all persons
similarly situated". (App. Br. p. 29.) It is this very point
which brings into focus the gravamen of the offense which
the Ordinance 20-3-2 (a) commits. What is there about the
partnership business of a lawyer which distinguishes it
from a partnership or corporate business of a grocery merchant, a stockbroker, industrial development firm, advertising firm, public relation experts, barbers or any other members of the community who offer personal services? The
Ordinance certainly does not provide us with any reason
why such businesses, including lawyers, are not "similarly
situaited". The trial Court found that there was no rational
basis to single out lawyers from other personal service nonprofessional businesses for excessive license tax. That Finding is fully warranted for there is no reasonable criterion
or basis to discriminate against Plaintiffs and other lawyers
under this type of a license revenue tax.
Appellant apparently claims, as a basis for discriminatory treatment, that the combination of lawyers doing business as a partnership increases the respective income of
each partner. Assuming for argument the truth of that
statement, is it any less true that combinations of stockbrokers, chemists, public relation agents and merchants doing business as partners, corporations or other associations
also return higher incomes than sole proprietorships? We
submit not. All such business associations are on equal
plane so far as the capability to produce income is concerned.
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The nub of Appellant's argument seems to be that the
businesses of lawyers may be subjected to a higher license
fee tax than the businesses of all non-professionals because
of the amount of income produced in the lawyer's business.
Were the subject Ordinance a graduated income tax and
were all businesses, partnerships, corporations, sole proprietorships, and other associations subject to the same tax, Appellant's argument would have some merit. (See Davis V.
Ogden City, supra.) But the Ordinance in question is not
that type of tax. Its enabling clause refers to it as a license
tax levied upon the business of every person in Salt Lake
City. It is only after reciting the general enacting clause as
to all businesses that an excess formula is set out for a computation of the license fee as to lawyers and other professions. See Appendix 1. It is that formula, biased and discriminatory as it is, which renders the Ordinance unconstitutionally void and unenforceable.
POINT II.
AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE
NOT SUPPORTIVE OF ITS POSITION IN THIS
CASE.
Appellant has cited in its brief several decisions in aid
of its contention that the trial Court erred in declaring the
Ordinance unconstitutional. For the most part, these cases
are distinguishable on their facts from the case at bar, and
in several instances, such authorities actually support the
judgment of the trial Court and the position of Plaintiffs
herein.
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We welcome Appellant's citation of authorities which
essentially hold that a license fee tax "must operate equally
on all persons similarly situated". Clark V. Titusville, 184
U. S. 329 (1902). (Appellant's Brief p. 15.) Nor do we
find any fault with Appellant's quotations from the Corpus
Juris Secundum to the effect that "different licenses or
taxes [may] be imposed on the various classes, provided
that the classification is reasonable and is defined with fair
certainty." 53 C. J. S. Licenses Sec. 22(a) and (b) at 53537. (Appellant's Br. p. 10.) These principles are fully embodied in the decisions of this Court in Davis v. City of
Ogden, supra, and Orem City v. Pyne, supra, and as discussed in Point I of this Brief, are the touchstone of the
finding of unconstitutionality herein.
In a number of cases cited by Appellant, the taxing Ordinance under construction established classifications of
taxpayers on the basis of gross revenue, capital worth, or
some other objective economic standard. Salt Lake City v.
Christenson Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 Pac. 523 (1908); Clark V.
Titusville, supra; Garbade v. City of Portland, 188 Ore. 158,
214 P. 2d 1000 (1950). In those cases, no type of business
was singled out by name for excessive or disparate tax
treatment. In those cases no business or partnership of
lawyers was required to pay a $96.00 license fee tax while
other businesses in the community, using the same community services, employing the same number of personnel and
producing the same or a greater amount of income, were
taxed $42.00. Those are the facts with which we are here
dealing, and it is that simple but substantial difference
which makes such cases cited by Appellant unauthoritative.
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Menlove V. Salt Lake County, 18 U. 2d 203, 418 P. 2d:
227 (1966) and Garret Freightlines, Inc. V. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523 (1943), referred to
in Appellant's Brief are distinguishable and irrelevant since
they were not enacted under the authority or sanction of a
statute such as Utah Code Ann. §10-8-80 (the enabling legislation for the instant ordinance) which, itself, requires
that the license taxes imposed must be uniform with respect
to the class upon which they are imposed.
Appellant places considerable weight on the case of
City of San Mateo V. Mallin, 59 Cal. App. 2d 653,139 P. 2d
351 (1943). The Ordinance there in question, unlike that
now being reviewed, applied equally to all businesses alike.
Lawyers and other professions were not singled out for
special treatment. The following quotation from that case
clearly illustrates this fact:
"The ordinance was amended in April, 1936, to
provide that where two or more persons of like businesses, trade calling or profession are associated as
partners, or as employer and employee, then an additional license tax in a less amount shall be paid for
each additional person after the first." 139 P. 2d at
352.
Under the San Mateo Ordinance, therefore, any partnership or association had to bear the additional tax
whether it consisted of lawyers or meat cutters. This is exactly the type of treatment which Plaintiffs here seek — to
be taxed the same, no greater and no lesser, than all other
associations and organizations in the business community.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Indeed, the Mullin case goes even further to point up the
distinction which seems to have evaded Appellant here:
"While the state certificate is a prerequisite to
practice, the actual practice is a business
. . . .
The tax is levied upon the business and not the person. Whether that business is conducted by one, or
more than one, associated as partners or as employer and employee it is still in the class of business
as that word is used in the ordinance." 139 P. 2d at
354. (Emphasis added.)
A full reading of the Mullin decision will disclose that it
buttresses the position of Plaintiffs, here, and substantially
rejects the arguments of Appellant.
Appellant refers to the early case of Blanchard V. State
of Florida, 30 Fla. 223, 11 So. 785 (1892), which involved
almost exclusively the interpretation of a local statute. It
is apparent from the decision in Blanchard that no question
of constitutionality of the statute was raised therein, either
as to the due process or equal protection which it afforded.
Accordingly, it has no place in the determination of the
issues raised in this appeal. It is unnecessary to discuss,
piece by piece and case by case, the remaining decisions
from other jurisdictions cited by Appellant in its Brief, for
they can be placed in the same catalogs, distinguishable on
their facts from the facts before this Court, or as having
been determined without consideration of the constitutional
issues raised by Plaintiffs herein.
In the ultimate analysis herein, decisions from without
Utah are of no more than academic interest, for this case
may be resolved upon the firm precedent of the decisions of
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this Court in Davis V. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d
616 (1959) and Or em City V. Pyne, 16 U. 2d 355, 401 P. 2d
181 (1965), viewed in light of the statutory authorization
of 10-8-80 U. C. A. The discrimination, without reason or
justification, against Plaintiffs in this case, is obvious. It
may not be condoned or sanctioned under the guise of legislative discretion of Salt Lake City or under an attempt to
label as a graduated income tax what is in fact and law, a
license fee tax.
CONCLUSION
The Ordinance 20-3-2 of Salt Lake City, unfairly, unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminates against the Plaintiffs and denies to them due process of law and the full and
equal protection of the law as guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 7
of the Utah State Constitution and Amendment XIV of the
United States Constitution.
The determination of the trial Court herein that said
Ordinance is unconstitutional that it unreasonably discriminates against the Plaintiffs and that it denies to them their
constitutional guarantees, should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
GORDON L. ROBERTS,
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
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APPENDIX NUMBER 2
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

OREM CITY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff',
vs.
DEE PYNE,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4039
MEMORANDUM DECISION
and

Defendant

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Dee Pyne was charged with the crime of a misdemeanor in failing to pay a license tax to Orem City for an
automobile business operated by him in Orem. He was convicted in the Orem City Court and has appealed his conviction to the District Court, claiming that the license ordinance is void as to him.
The defendant's appeal entitles him to a trial de novo.
He has entered anew a plea of not guilty, but has stipulated
that during the time charged in the complaint he conducted
a used car business and made sales subject to the sales tax
imposed by the State of Utah; and that he has not paid any
Orem City license tax. He now moves the court for a dismissal of the complaint, solely on the ground that the ordinance is invalid in imposing any tax on his used car sales
business.
Ordinance No. 26 of Orem City is the ordinance in
question. It was enacted under the authority given to cities
by Section 10-8-80 U. C. A. 1953, to tax businesses for revenue purposes; provided, however, "that all such license
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fees and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon
which they are imposed." The ordinancie declares that its
purpose is to raise revenue.
Section 3 of the ordinance levies a tax of 1/10 of 1%
on the gross sales of businesses in Orem City engaged in
selling tangible personal property, where such sales are
subject to the Utah State sales tax, with a minimum of
$6.25 per quarter-year and a maximum of $75.00 for the
same period.
If the defendant's business is covered at all it is covered by this general Section, and not by any specific provision of the ordinance.
The law presumes that the ordinance is valid until the
contrary is shown. However, city licensing ordinances enacted for tax purposes must be strictly construed, and in
cases of reasonable doubt, the construction should be
against the government. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498, 52 S. Ct. 260, 263, 76 L. Ed. 422.
Appeal of School District of City of Allentown, (1952), 370
Pa. 161, 87 A. 2d 480.
The principal claim for invalidity is that the ordinance
is discriminatory and arbitrary in its application to defendant's business.
In Matthews v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303, at page
277 of the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court said: "Neither
the constitution nor the statute authorizes . . . ordinances, . . . to tax citizens arbitrarily and unjustly, by
license which confers no privilege that was not previously
enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation. Unjust and
illegal discrimination between persons in taxation, and the
denial of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of the
constitution of this state, and of the United States."
As to what constitutes illegal and unjust discrimination
in taxation, our Court has held: "Discrimination is the
essence of classification and does violence to the constitution only when the basis upon which it is founded is unrea-
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sonable, In fixing the limits of the class, the legislative body
has a wide discretion and this court may not concern itself
with the wisdom or policy of the law. Our function is to determine whether an enactment operates equally upon all
persons similarly situated. If it does then the discrimination
is within permissible legislative limits. If it does not, then
the discrimination would be without reasonable basis and
the act does not meet the test of constitutionality." Slater
v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P. 2d 153.
This indicates that the classification by the legislative
body must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with
uniformity upon similar kinds of businesses and with substantial equality of the tax burden to all members of the
same class. The imposition of taxes which are to a substantial degree unequal in their operation upon similar kinds of
businesses is prohibited.
What is the situation with respect to discrimination
and reasonableness as this ordinance is written and may be
applied and enforced ?
Section 1 of the ordinance lists 201 purported businesses for taxation and fixes a tax rate for each. A few of
these names do not indicate businesses at all and are beyond
the power of the City to tax for revenue purposes. Excluding these few, the remainder represent legitimate businesses, subject to taxation for revenue purposes. Even here,
however, the lack of definitions renders the application of
the ordinance and the tax uncertain, confusing, and perhaps
inequitable. And since this section and the ordinance as a
whole does not attempt to tax all businesses within the city,
it may well be questioned as to any equality in spreading the
tax burden.
Section 3, standing alone, appears to be fair, reasonable, and definite in its application to all businesses generally in Orem City selling tangible personal property. This
is a reasonable and proper classification fixed by the City.
The difficulty arises when Section 1 is conisdered along
with Section 3; because Section 1 places several businesses,
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that would otherwise be covered by Section 3, on a flat annual fee basis that may be only one-twelfth as much as if
they were on the gross sales basis, and taxable under Section 3. Why should one business selling tangible personal
property at retail be subjected to a tax of up to $300.00 per
year, while other businesses (also selling tangible personal
property at retail) such as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement plant, creamery, butcher shop, photography shop, or a dealer specializing in the sale of goods made
in Japan, Hong Kong, Formosa, China, or India, doing the
same volume of business, be taxed $25.00?
To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a reasonable
classification of businesses generally for taxation and fix a
tax rate therefor based on gross sales with certain minimum and maximum amounts, and by another section of the
same ordinance exclude from the operation of Section 3,
certain businesses naturally falling within its classification,
and apply to such excluded businesses a tax rate on a flat
annual basis that cannot possibly be more than the minimum for the unexcluded businesses is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory. Such exclusion assures to the
excluded businesses a concession not accorded to other businesses similarly situated.
It is clear that the ordinance is void as it applies to the
defendant's business in this case, and the motion for dismissal is granted.
This ruling is limited to the question presented by the
defendant's motion. It is not within the province of the
Court at this time to pass on the validity of the entire ordinance. It may be valid as to some businesses and invalid
as to others. As hereinabove stated, in a few instances
there seems to be an entire absence of authority for the city
to impose any tax at all for revenue purposes.
Dated this 3rd day of August, 1964.
MAURICE HARDING, Judge.
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